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3 
Schopenhauer’s Early Theory of Will 
Arthur Schopenhauer is renowned not only for his ideas on pessimism, but also for his 
theory of will, which is the topic of the current essay. I look to explain Schopenhauer’s early 
theory of will as expounded in his Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will and Über die vierfache 
Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde (On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient 
Reason).1 These two works are clear and to the point on Schopenhauer’s early views on will, and 
serve as an adequate foundation for exploring his later, more mature doctrine of will (Lehre des 
Willen). First, I will give some preliminary remarks about his philosophy. Then, I will go 
through his dissertation, outlining the four expressions of his principle of sufficient reason 
(Ausdrücke des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde), paying particular attention to causality and 
motivation.
2
 Following that, I will go through his Prize Essay, paying careful attention to his 
notion of character and his allusions to the transcendental freedom of the will. Finally, I will 
expound some critical comments on the coherence and implications of his early system.  
 
Preliminary remarks---  
 Schopenhauer, completely repulsed by the metaphysical systems of Descartes, Spinoza, 
and Leibniz, particularly in their attempts to explain (and all previous attempts) how and why 
“Nothing is without a ground or reason as to why it is rather than not,
3
” proposes to build a 
whole, revised epistemological system. The explanation of this question is essentially the 
                                                 
1  I will refer to the former as his “Prize Essay,” as is customary. Additionally, I will refer to the latter simply as his 
dissertation. 
2 “Satz” is translated as “principle,” yet I note, it is also translatable as “statement, or sentence,” and is for 
Schopenhauer merely a way in which one can express the reasons or grounds on which “Nothing is without a ground 
or reason as to why it is rather than not” in words. 
3 Dissertation, §5, p. 6. 
4 
expression of a principle, the knowledge of which will unite the links of a system. For he says, 
“But what else except the principle of sufficient reason unites the links of a system?
4
” Such a 
system would be inclusive of an explanation of everything we can know, do know, and how. It is 
this epistemological system that is the primary concern in Schopenhauer’s early works; the four 
expressions of the principle being the primary concern in his dissertation. 
 Schopenhauer differentiates between cause and ground for knowing. He rebukes 
Descartes and Aristotle for having conflated the two, and later goes on to quote Spinoza, 
particularly how he failed so badly in his Monadologie that he said the phrase ratio seu causa5 
eight or so times on one page. Schopenhauer later gives an explanation of his own distinction 
between the two: “reason” or “ground” is that which answers, “why does (x) occur as a necessary 
consequent in the brain of a subject, i.e., as a representation?” It should be noted, of course, that 
representation is a key element of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, and is a word translated from the 
German Vorstellung, to put in front of one’s self or to imagine; all definite knowledge is merely 
a mental representation or “picture” in the brain of the thinking subject, according to 
Schopenhauer. “Cause” is an affliction of one empirical state of a thing on another, immediately 
perceived by the thinking subject. Hence, cause refers to empirical phenomena exerting 
influences on one another outside of the thinking subject; ground or reason is how and why we 
know something within the subject.  
 
  
 
 
                                                 
4 Ibid., §4. 
5 Ibid., §8, p. 20. “Cause or reason.” 
5 
 
The principle--- 
“Not authorities, however, but reasons are the philosopher’s weapons.”
6
 ~Schopenhauer 
 To elaborate more about the principle, its most general expression is found in the writings 
of Wolff, “nihil est sine ratione cur potius sit quam non sit,” or, “Nothing is without a ground or 
reason as to why it is rather than is not.” The principle in question points out that there are 
certain ways in which we recognize and are cognizant of certain classes of objects. Additionally, 
each class functions by way of a certain faculty of the subject. Each of these faculties is called 
the “subjective correlate” of its respective class of objects. Likewise, the knower or perceiver of 
these objects is called the subject. All four of these faculties taken together are what 
Schopenhauer calls “the faculty of cognition.” Therefore, the principle of sufficient reason is a 
principle that expresses how the thinking subject necessarily uses his understanding (object is 
causality), reason (object is the concept), pure intuition (object is being), and self-consciousness 
(object is will), or the four faculties of human cognition.
7
 The first class of these objects is 
similar to the Kantian phenomena; it is comprised of intuited data of the physical world through 
the a priori forms of pure sensibility, e.g., space and time. These data are the changes of states in 
matter, which comprise our understanding of causality.
8
  
 For Schopenhauer, each class of known objects warrants a special expression of his 
principle. In each of these expressions, there is the positing of a cause or ground, and in each 
circumstance, there is a necessary consequent. Schopenhauer says of necessity:  
                                                 
6 Prize Essay, p. 81. 
7 “Schopenhauer later gives an explanation of the will’s transcendental freedom (Prize Essay, p. 86), where 
Schopenhauer thinks it is transcendent beyond any definite explanation of the principle of sufficient reason.  
8 Note that Schopenhauer considers causality itself to be an a priori form of pure sensibility, in dissention from 
Kant’s original thinking. 
6 
 The principle of sufficient reason in all its forms is the sole support and sole source of all 
 necessity. For necessity has no true and clear meaning except that of the inevitability of 
 the consequent with the positing of the ground.
9
  
Hence, he has four expressions of the principle, and four classes of objects which are possible by 
way of the soundness of the principle. We begin with the first class of objects, those of empirical 
intuition. 
  
First class of objects--- 
 The first class of objects is that of “intuitive, perceptive, complete, empirical 
representations,” or just empirically intuited objects.
10
 These objects and the process in which 
they are intuited and immediately understood in terms of causality is explained below. 
 Working from Kant’s principles of the transcendental aesthetic, Schopenhauer explains 
that everything outside of the thinking subject, or not “underneath the skin” is in a constant 
process of changes. His insight comes in his assertion that instead of bodies directly affecting 
one another with their own force, as Hume’s famous illustration with the billiard balls presumes, 
bodies of matter are merely the substratum in which change occurs.
11
 Furthermore, change is the 
process of one state of an object (matter is synonymous with “substance,” and comprises all 
empirical objects) becoming responsible for the ensuing state of matter in itself or another. 
According to Schopenhauer, causality is properly understood when the mind (brain) of the 
subject empirically intuits these changes of states. This perception is done “immediately,” a point 
                                                 
9 Dissertation, §49, p. 225. 
10 Ibid., §17, p. 45. 
11 Schopenhauer’s affinity to Locke in this respect is not coincidental; he frequently cites references to Locke’s 
Essay on the Human Understanding and his notions of substrata and the correspondence between the qualities of 
objects and mnemonic impression in the subject. 
7 
he is persistent on, and criticizes Kant for imagining that causal understanding is attained only 
indirectly through a paralogistic analysis, or rather, through categorical understanding which first 
requires the process of imagination. In an immediate apprehension of those changes of states 
which happen outside of the subject, the understanding necessarily posits a cause to the observed 
phenomenon, the understanding of which constitutes what Schopenhauer calls empirical 
intuition.12 This understanding is possible a priori, or prior to all sensuous experience; that is, the 
understanding will formulate this transcendental notion of a cause within matter for every and 
any potential experience.  
 Thus, Schopenhauer calls the expression of the principle for this class of objects, 
“principium rationis  sufficientis fiendi,” or “principle of sufficient reason of becoming.” This is 
a fitting expression, for it unequivocally illustrates that changes of states of objects are being 
intuited, and not mere objects. Furthermore, it is important to know what it is that correlates the 
objects in every class to the brain of the subject, or that which lies “under the skin.” 
Schopenhauer calls this the “subjective correlate” and in the first class of objects here explained, 
the subjective correlate is the understanding, which is essentially the same thing as the faculty of 
this class of objects, as already mentioned.    
 I will now give an illustration of how this notion of causal understanding is supposed to 
function in the mind of the subject. For example, let us say that I see a car accident on the street 
in front of me. One car is damaged. Immediately, my eyes gather data of the spatial state of the 
material body; this is all that can be accomplished in my body, that is, with only my eyes. 
However, with the immediate aid of my understanding, I am able to empirically intuit otherwise 
                                                 
12 This is to be distinguished from what he calls “pure intuition,” which is expressed under another form of his 
principle. Furthermore, I have omitted Payne’s translation of “perception,” since it adds nothing to a description of 
the process of intuition.  
8 
meaningless data and postulate a cause of these states a priori. The postulation is not simply that 
body a) causes body b) to be wrecked; on the contrary, my postulation is an immediate 
understanding that certain conditions of states of surrounding objects (material bodies) 
contributed to the currently observed state.
13
 For example, the slipperiness of the road, the speed 
of the cars, how much pressure had been collectively building in the atmosphere, etc., are all 
changing states of things which contributed to the effected state; and these conditions and 
changes are considered a cause.
14
 In this fashion, the objects of the understanding are the 
changes in the empirically intuited matter, and that which correlates them (or allows them to be 
represented in the brain) is the understanding, here explained with an emphasis on its perception 
of causality. Hence, the above gives us a good explanation of the states of causality.  
 A few things should now be said about the details of the process of empirical intuition, 
namely, more about the a priori forms of sensibility, and the possibility of perceiving what 
Schopenhauer call change and coexistence. First of all, Schopenhauer keeps Kant’s a priori 
forms of sensibility, i.e., space and time as two “windows” through which empirical intuition 
takes place.
15
 Schopenhauer says in his dissertation, §18, page 42, “The forms of these 
representations are those of the inner and outer senses, namely time and space, but only as filled 
                                                 
13 Care must be taken in describing anything in the process of empirical intuition as “observation.” Schopenhauer 
does not believe this mere act to be possible in anyone who possesses the ability to use the principle of sufficient 
reason. However, “observation” is a good term to describe a hypothetically isolated step in the process of empirical 
intuition. It refers solely to the impression of data from outside the subject upon the eyes. 
14 They are considered as such somewhat conglomerately. Schopenhauer calls the dominant causal state, if 
identifiable, the κατ’ εξοχην, or “according to prominence,” “par excellance,” etc.  
15 “A priori form of sensibility” is a term I have taken from Coppleston’s explanation of Kant’s Transcendental 
Aesthetic. In a Schopenhauerian context, it refers to the transcendentally necessary “windows” of time, space, and 
causality in able to comprise the immediate understanding.  
9 
are they perceivable. Their perceivability is matter…”16 He explains further that the coexistence 
of any two objects is possible only by way of both space and time; for if there were only time, 
then there would be nowhere for another thing to exist simultaneously.
17
 For example, if 
anything existed at one moment (It would also have to be without body, or extension, and 
Schopenhauer does not take this to be a possible process within empirical intuition.), it could not 
be compared to anything else at that same time without thinking about it by means of space, i.e., 
by means of juxtaposition of two things in space. To further illustrate, Schopenhauer makes the 
converse claim that if there were only the a priori form of sensibility of space, then there would 
be no perceivable change. He says, “… for alteration or change is succession of states, and 
succession is possible only in time.”18 Therefore, in order that change be intuited, the a priori 
form of sensibility of time is also necessary; both space and time are retained from Kant’s 
philosophy as fundamental tools of the understanding. And yet the Schopenhauerian 
understanding is immediate, and requires yet another a priori form of intuition: causality, which 
has been explained in the example above. 
 I will give a final example that Schopenhauer uses to illustrate our causal, spatial, 
temporal, and immediate understanding.
19
 When I turn my head on its side, for example, I do not 
seem to perceive that the world has turned on its side. Actually, I still recognize everything as 
being right-side-up. This takes no analysis to understand; it is an immediate adjustment of how I 
understand the data fed into my eyes (sensibility, immediately aided by the understanding).  
                                                 
16 By “perceivably,” Schopenhauer means “intuitable.” Also, by “filled,” Schopenhauer means “complete,” (I.e., a 
representation in the understanding which is filled in actual space; and so it has body in the real world.), and calls it 
such on page 46. However, the term (“complete”) does not recur as necessary language in the dissertation.  
17 Dissertation, § 18, p. 46. 
18 Ibid., §18, p.46 
19 All understanding is necessarily spacial, temporal, causal, and immediate, but this example will emphasize the 
claimed immediacy of the understanding. 
 
10 
 
Second class---  
 Now I will explain Schopenhauer’s next class of objects, that of abstract concepts. By 
using the understanding’s material from empirical intuition, the faculty of reason (Vernunft) is 
able to formulate abstract concepts and signify these concepts with words and language. 
Accordingly, language is the medium through which the faculty of reason is able to 
conceptualize individual experiences.
20
 On the faculty of reason, Schopenhauer says this is a 
“…very special cognitive faculty belonging exclusively to man, is based on the fact that he has a 
class of representations not shared by any animal.”
21
 Schopenhauer calls this expression of the 
principle, “principium rationis sufficientis cognoscendi,” or principle of sufficient reason of 
knowing. We can certainly infer from that reason is a “special” faculty that what is referred to in 
the Prize Essay as the “faculty of cognition” is indeed the general faculty of human intelligence, 
viz., cognition. This inference stands as important, in that we realize that the faculty of reason is 
one species of the faculty of cognition, which is the genus.  
 Indeed, forming (abstracting) and manipulating (reflecting) abstract concepts turns out to 
be a vital aspect of Schopenhauer’s epistemology. He defines concepts as, “representations from 
representations,” and repeatedly mentions that they contain a breadth of material and knowledge 
far beyond any individually intuited cause.
 22
 Also, he describes them as being a genus- as such, 
they are general, and without much empirical content, i.e., empirically intuited content. The 
higher the concept, the more general, and subsequently the “poorer” it becomes. The faculty of 
                                                 
20 Schopenhauer calls the formulation of concepts “abstraction,” although the actual German is unknown to me. 
Similarly, the intellect using these concepts is called “reflection.” See his Dissertation, §27. 
21 Ibid., § 26, p.145 
22 Ibid., §26, p.146. 
11 
reason “apprehends” many empirically intuited experiences, and from them forms an outline of 
sorts: a concept.
 23
 As such, the faculty of reason is the subjective correlate of this second class, 
in that it correlates empirical intuition to concepts in the brain of the subject.         
 Accordingly, Schopenhauer maintains that without concepts, no knowledge is possible; 
we can therefore say that concepts are transcendentally argued for. He quotes Aristotle as saying, 
“For without the universal, knowledge is impossible (Metaphysics, XII, c.9.)” Schopenhauer also 
maintains that concepts are capable of excluding considerations of time and space as a priori 
forms of sensibility, and can therefore think beyond the limits of time.
24
 However, one must 
differentiate between an example of a concept (empirically intuited cause or set of causes) and 
the concept itself (general set of outlines of what has been experienced by the subject). Hence, all 
empirical intuition serves as the raw material of concepts, although much of the detail of this 
material is lost in the formation of the more general concept. 
 We now move to explore the judgment, the four types of truth of the second class of 
objects, and its expression of the principle. First then, Schopenhauer says that a judgment is “…a 
combining or separating of two or more concepts under various restrictions…,” or basically a 
way in which concepts are related to each other and empirical intuition as forms of knowledge. 
This relationship is actually a grounding of the concepts existence, or the necessary truth as to 
why it is rather than is not.
25
 When this concept in the brain of the subject is (and it must 
necessarily be so) grounded in one of the four classes of truth, it then is called true. Additionally, 
                                                 
23 §26. This merely signifies a transition of empirical intuition to being represented as concepts, or general outlines 
of many experiences. While this process is not physiologically explained in detail, there is little doubt that the brain 
(synonymous to the mind for Schopenhauer) is able to do it. 
24 §28, p. 154 
25 This is entirely different from cause, which is strictly limited to empirical intuition and the understanding. 
12 
it can be called a true consequent of a ground of knowledge.
26
 With this claim Schopenhauer 
wants to establish four different kinds of conceptual truths, or grounds of knowledge. Again, 
language is the medium of concepts, and concepts are the material of knowledge, based 
originally on the representations formed from empirical intuition. And so he wants there to be 
four sorts of concepts, all of which are true or grounded in four different ways, that is, they are 
necessarily the way that they are rather than not because of four different ways in which they are 
grounded, or have reason to exist in a certain way, hence in a certain class (one of the four).  
 To clarify, Schopenhauer says that a judgment is true under any one of the following four 
conditions. When any of these four conditions is met by a concept, i.e., when a concept is 
grounded in any one of these four ways, it is categorized into one of four classes of truth. For 
example, the first condition is when a concept is grounded in another concept; hence, this sort of 
judgment (necessary grounding) is called formal or logical, and constitutes what he calls logical 
truth. The second condition constitutes what he calls empirical truth, and this is when a concept 
is grounded directly in the representations formed from empirical intuition. The third condition is 
when a concept is grounded in a priori forms of pure sensibility, or “…the conditions for the 
possibility of all experience…,” and Schopenhauer calls a judgment that meets this criterion one 
of transcendental truth. 27 The fourth and final condition is when a concept is grounded in “the 
formal conditions of all thought which lie within our faculty of reason,” or basically, four formal 
rules of rational thought.
28
  A judgment that meets this condition is called a metalogical 
judgment. Thus, I have summarized the judgment and each of the four classes of true judgments. 
 Finally, a quick overview of the principium rationis sufficientis cognoscendi. 
                                                 
26 Schopenhauer later mentions “ground of knowledge and consequent”  in his Dissertation, §36, p. 195. 
27 Ibid., § 32, p. 160 
28 Ibid., §32, p. 161 
13 
On the principle of sufficient reason of knowing, Schopenhauer says the following: 
 As such, it asserts that, if a judgment is to express a piece of knowledge, it must have a 
 sufficient ground or reason; by virtue of this quality, it then receives the predicate true. 
 Truth is therefore the reference of a judgment to something different therefrom. This 
 something is called the ground or reason of the judgment and, as we will see, itself 
 admits of a considerable variety of classes. But as it is always something on which the 
 judgment is supported or rests, the German word Grund is suitably chosen.29  
 
So, this is basically a summation of what has already been discussed, namely, how a concept is 
grounded, expressed by the principle of sufficient reason of knowing, and classified into 
constituting a true judgment. 
 
Third class--- 
“Habe Mut dich deines eigenen Verstandes zu bedienen! Ist also der Wahlspruch der 
Aufklärung.“30 ~Kant 
“Have courage to use your own reason! Thus is the motto of the enlightenment” 
 The expression of the principle for the third class of objects is principium rationis 
sufficientis essendi, or “principle of sufficient reason of being,” and this class of objects is called 
that of pure intuition.31 Essentially, this is where the a priori forms of space and time diverge 
from pure sensibility, and their “infinite extension and divisibility” become the objects of pure 
intuition. According to Schopenhauer, this is a distinct class and the relations of being (ex., the 
three sides of an equilateral triangle, § 15) such as “above and below, front and back, first and 
last” are not knowable by any other means than that of pure intuition.  
                                                 
29 Ibid., §29, p.156 
30 “Have courage to use your own reason! Thus is the motto of the enlightenment.” From, An Answer to the 
Question, What is Enlightenment? 
31 Dissertation, §35, 36. p. 193, 194. 
14 
 Schopenhauer gives three subcategories of the objects of pure intuition, and they are: 
Ground or Reason of Being in Space (§37), Ground or Reason of Being in Time: Arithmetic 
(§38), and Geometry (§39). In §37, Schopenhauer comes to the conclusion that every being in 
space ( any object or representation representation, such as a line, circle, or hypotenuse of a 
triangle, for example) is grounded in every other one. Thus, there is an infinite regress or infinite 
reciprocity of grounding one thing to another in space, ad infinitum. This means that so far as the 
subject can consider the existence or being (always relative to his operations according to the 
principle of sufficient reason) of any geometrical object in space, its position is relative to the 
position of any other potential object. The position of this object is important in considering the 
grounds of its being, because the definition of the object’s existence, e.g., how it exists as a fixed 
line or collection of points in space in relation to other points, which can be considered in space, 
is entirely relational and relative to the position of other points. If we simplify the consideration 
to the existence of a hypothetical point in space, we come to ask ourselves, “In what is the 
existence of this point grounded?” The answer, as Schopenhauer provides it, is that the existence 
of our hypothetical point is by definition positional- but positional to what? The existence or 
being of the point is necessarily relative to the position of another point in space, and this could 
be any anywhere in space. Therefore, if the subject is to consider the existence of one single 
point, he must consider the position of the point to be the extent of its existence. As for the 
grounding of the existence of this point, since its existence is positional, its existence is relative 
and positional to another point in space, or any other, ad infinitum; this is what Schopenhauer 
means when he says the grounding of the being of one object in space is grounded in the being of 
another. One point is necessarily relative to another, and another, and that one to another’s, etc. 
The same applies to lines and shapes in space; for example, the existence of one line is grounded 
15 
in the existence of every other potential line (although thinking about two lines simultaneously 
and merely by means of space is impossible, since coexistence requires time, as discussed 
above), since it extends infinitely in two directions and must eventually contact another potential 
line relative and in relation to its direction and position. This means that the diametric line of a 
circle necessarily exists in spatial relation to any other diametric line which is formable within 
the circumference of the same circle.  
 In § 38 and 39, on arithmetic and geometry, respectively, Schopenhauer explains how 
geometrical and algebraic axioms are pure intuitions. The demonstration following from such 
axioms, say, Euclid’s demonstration of equilateral triangles (Fig.3 in the Dissertation), where “If 
in a triangle two angles are equal, the sides subtending them are also equal,” even if the length of 
the sides is multiplied or divided, is nothing more than the necessary consequent of being (of 
equilateral sides, for example) of the purely intuited axiom. In arithmetic, demonstrations are 
done solely in consideration of time. In geometry, merely by space.
32
 However, I maintain that 
these claims are not possibly sound, taken together, since geometry must have coexistence, and 
hence both space and time, as we have clearly discussed. Perhaps these axioms and 
demonstrations could be united in the concept of matter and hence be entirely conceptual, rather 
than “purely intuited.” Accordingly, these a priori considerations would be entirely within the 
faculty of reason, and it is hard to imagine why Schopenhauer makes an additional class of 
objects for them. Regardless, he maintains that all geometrical and arithmetic demonstration 
works in this way. Schopenhauer also says that this method of demonstration, more akin to 
elenchus, gives way to no new insight.33 
                                                 
32 Dissertation, §47, p.224.  
33 Ibid., §39, p. 200. Elenchus is a term used in different ways. In Schopenhauer’s dissertation, it is said to be a 
syllogism demonstrating the contradictory of a proposition, a refutation. I have also heard it used to describe the 
16 
Fourth class--- 
“ ‘Ο νουσ εστιν ειδοσ ειδων, και ‘η ’αισθησισ ’ειδοσ ’αισθητϖν.” 
“The understanding is the form of forms, and sensibility the form of the senses.”
34
 
 With the preceding sections out of the way, we can move into the final and most 
interesting class of representations, which are governed by the principle, principium rationis 
sufficientis agendi, or simply, “law of motivation.” This law essentially states that some 
representations and judgments are “…produced by an act of will which has a motive.”
35
 
Coppleston provides a good explanation of the object of the fourth class by saying that the sole 
object of this class is the acting subject, or in Schopenhauer’s words, “the subject of willing 
considered as object for the knowing subject.”
36
 This just means that the willing subject is being 
considered, and the ground of his willing is called a motive. By willing, Schopenhauer means 
immediate self inflicted action, but the relationship between action, character, and motives is not 
discussed in his dissertation, but rather, he refers to his Prize Essay, which is what will be 
discussed next, in order to better explain motivation and the subjective correlate of self-
consciousness. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
early Socratic method written Plato, where Socrates elicits a definition (of Justice from Thrasymachus, for example, 
in the Republic, although this is actually a later work), and then proceeds to refute it without a fully constructive 
solution. 
34 Dissertation, §41, p. 210. A very philosophical statement. 
35 Ibid., §44, p. 216. I must point out that Schopenhauer has already precluded the possibility of a judgment which 
lacks a necessary and determining ground by the faculty of reason. Therefore, speaking of a “judgment that that does 
not follow its previously existing ground or reason” is quite meaningless. However, he still says this explicitly in his 
explanation of the law of motivation. The only sensical possibility I can think of is that Schopenhauer meant 
something else, and the translation was fuddled in some way or another. 
36 See Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Vol. VII, Part II, p. 30 (listed in the bibliography). 
17 
The Prize Essay--- 
I. Definitions 
Schopenhauer says early on that “…a free will would be one that is determined by 
nothing at all,” essentially setting up the parameters of a free will which will here be considered 
as relevant. It can be stated in the proposition liberum arbitrium indifferentiae, or “free choice of 
indifference.” He also has a discussion of exactly how freedom can be defined, but for our 
purposes, non determined will is a sufficient criterion for a free will. The first (later condemned 
by Schopenhauer as errant) proposition of the freedom of the will is stated as, “I can do what I 
will.” This proposition comes from what he calls the immediate self-consciousness, which is 
discussed next. 
II. The will before self-consciousness  
The aforementioned proposition, “I can do what I will” is said to be in the immediate 
self-consciousness of every subject. In fact, its demonstrability and certainty (for example, I can 
lift my arm, when I will) are nothing more than that; in other words, this proposition tells us 
nothing about the actual freedom or determination of the will. In ch.2, Schopenhauer tells us that 
self-consciousness is, “The consciousness of our own self in contrast to the consciousness of 
other things.”37 This self-consciousness is immediate, and becomes aware of itself “as one who 
wills.” Since self-consciousness is completely internal, it has no knowledge of external objects, 
or, in short, any of the other three modes of cognition, i.e., empirical intuition, reflection, and 
pure intuition. In terms of willing then, the self consciousness is aware of its ability to will. It is 
not aware in the least as to whether or not it (the subject of self consciousness) is actually free in 
what it wills. He says, “I can will, and when I will an action, the movable limbs of my body will 
                                                 
37 Prize Essay, p. 8. 
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at once and inevitably carry it out the moment I will it. In short, this is equivalent to saying that 
‘I can do what I will.’”38 But this does not mean that self-consciousness also asserts that “I am 
free to will what I will.” For this would assert the freedom of the will itself, as opposed to the 
freedom of the subject to do something in accordance with this will.39 The question now 
becomes one of how and to what extent, if at all, the internal will is determined by the outward 
motives toward which it aims (through bodily action, i.e., with the hands or feet, or mnemonic 
action, i.e., with the brain of the subject, although either action would be unrecognizable to the 
self-consciousness of the subject, since it is only aware that it is a subject that can do what it 
wills, not if the will itself is free).  
 To answer this question, Schopenhauer makes a distinction between wishing and willing. 
A wish is when the process of will is coming about, but to will is an exclusive, singular decision 
to take an action. For example, any subject is able to wish several and even contradictory, 
mutually exclusive things at any given time. However, he is only able to make a decision or act 
of will regarding one of them, at one exclusive time (he cannot will two things at once). Hence, 
Schopenhauer is easily able to refute the proposition of the common man, that is, “…in a given 
case, opposite acts of will are possible…,” an errant conclusion based off of the immediate yet 
inadequate knowledge of the self-consciousness.  
From what has been gathered so far, it is clear from the expression of self-consciousness 
that the subject can do what he wills, and so in this way his actions are dependant on his will 
alone (i.e., not on any external influence). We can therefore say that acts of will are grounded by 
the individuated will itself (the individual will of the subject). Yet what Schopenhauer really 
wants to know is on what grounds a particular or individuated will is dependant, if any. 
                                                 
38 Prize Essay, p. 14. 
39  Ibid., p. 14. 
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Before he does this, however, he makes a couple comments on the subjective 
consciousness, a part of which is the immediate self-consciousness. On the subjective 
consciousness in its totality, that is, with all four classes of knowledge, he says that all our 
scientific achievements are made by it when it uses its faculties to analyze the outside world of 
objects. The application of these faculties to the outside world includes the achievements of 
logic, natural science, and language, etc. Yet on the inner world of the subjective consciousness, 
he says, “…but inside it is dark, like a well blackened telescope. No principle a priori 
illuminates the night of its own interior; these lighthouses shine only outward.”
40
 Hence, there 
are no a priori principles that guide us to knowledge of the inward workings of our own total 
subjective consciousness or immediate self-consciousness. Instead, its faculties are designed to 
build knowledge about the outside world. And so to answer the above question, “On what 
ground(s) is a particular will dependent,” he subjects the question to the perspective of the 
consciousness of other things (external objects). 
III The will before the consciousness of other things 
Schopenhauer begins by summarizing the universality and central importance of the law 
of causality, or principium rationis sufficientis fiendi. He says, “We now approach this 
experience itself with our universal, a priori certain rule, which is therefore valid without 
exception for all possible experience, and consider the real objects given in experience…” 
Accordingly, he posits the grounds for the will in animals (humans included, only as more 
sophisticated species) as being motives. This ground of motivation stands in contrast to the 
“lower” ground of plant behavior, namely, stimulus. For illustration, one can imagine a plant, 
entirely devoid of self-consciousness as being able to grow toward direction a) or direction b). 
                                                 
40  Prize Essay, p. 19. 
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However, the determinate (ground for the consequent behavior, or growth,) will be how much 
light comes in on an average day from direction a) vs. direction b), etc, and this light is called 
one of many stimuli. It is easy to see from this example how similar stimulation and causality are 
for Schopenhauer. In animal species, however, there is the immediate self-consciousness; this 
creates a new terminology: will and motive.   
“When a human being wills, he wills something; his act of will is always directed to an 
object and is conceivable only in reference to such.” This object is called a motive. Furthermore, 
Schopenhauer claims that the manifestations of willing include all emotions of attraction and 
repugnance, in all degrees, in short, all the passions: love, hate, fear, anger, etc. All passions are 
“…definite affections of the same will that is active in decisions and actions.”
41
 In other words, 
through every action there is an affection on the will; and so the will is either appeased or 
abhorred, “…satisfied or unsatisfied, impeded or allowed its way.” This is comparable to the 
way in which a plant is determined to grow; indeed, Schopenhauer thinks our acts of will are 
determined by motives, just as states of objects are affected by one another, plants by stimuli, 
geometrical demonstrations by axioms, etc. He says, “On the assumption of the freedom of the 
will, every human action would be an inexplicable miracle- an effect without a cause.”
42
 This 
statement is of course referring to acts of will grounded in a motive.  In short, his view of human 
action and everything else has been completely deterministic up to this point. 
He defines “will” as the force behind our actions, and compares it to the unknown forces 
of nature, which manifest themselves in electrical activity, gravitational patterns, etc 
(physiological design is a latter development of his more mature theory of the manifestations of 
                                                 
41 Prize Essay, p.10. 
42 Ibid., p.40 
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the will). These forces are otherwise known as “gravity,” energy, polarity, etc. As such, will is 
“inexplicable,” and not knowable a priori but rather, “only through experience.”
43
   
Yet it is still possible for two different people to react differently in identical situations. 
To explain how, Schopenhauer posits his theory of character. He says of character, “Like the 
forces of nature, this character is also original, unalterable, and inexplicable.”
44
 He says it is 
individual, empirical, constant, and inborn. Individual means that it is different in every subject; 
if the consequent act of will is to be predicted of any given subject, the individual nature of his 
character must also be know. Of course, this is a seeming impossibility, given what 
Schopenhauer says above regarding the complete inexplicability of character. Character is 
empirical in that it is recognized solely through experience. According to Schopenhauer, this is 
why we are often surprised when the test of making a decision comes before, we often do not act 
as bravely or nobly as we had predicted. Because, namely, we require the actual experience in 
order to learn the qualities of our character. Character is constant in that it is unalterable; and it is 
inborn in that one is stuck with it, the way it is, from birth and so on. Schopenhauer tries to 
support this claim by giving examples of people whose decisions (reflecting an assumed quality 
of character) seemingly never change, but his evidence is somewhat lacking, given the 
immensity of his claims of the inborn, unalterable quality of individual character. Hence, 
character is supposed to be that thing which accounts for why and how different individuals are 
able to react differently to the same motive. 
Schopenhauer says that if a subject’s character and motive are given in a situation, his 
will is inevitably affected, and a consequent act of will must ensue.
45
 However, each 
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44 Ibid., p. 42  
45 Ibid., p. 50. 
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individuated will is affected differently, that is, emotively, by the acts of will it performs (it 
either likes or dislikes them). Furthermore, the real ground of an act of will is not the Will itself, 
but rather the motive, represented in the faculty of cognition (literally, “placed in front of” 
cognition, or vorgestellt). So, a given subject uses some faculty or another (probably reason) to 
represent a motive to himself, and with this motive, he immediately acts toward it. The 
representation of the motive to himself is accomplished within his faculty of reason (as an 
example of a concept), and his immediate self action and how his will feels thereafter are 
accomplished in his immediate self-consciousness.  
Schopenhauer says quite clearly, “The character is the empirically known, constant, and 
unalterable disposition of an individuated will...”
46
 This does not mean that the will is affected or 
determined by character, but rather, emotionally predisposed to like some acts of will better than 
others, within the immediate self-consciousness. However, to what extent an individuated will is 
emotionally predisposed is still not clear, and neither is the faculty in which one’s character is 
supposed to lie (Note, however, the quality of a given character does not exempt the subject from 
moral approbation, as one must then condemn the acting subject for having deficiencies in his 
inborn and unchanging character, or rather, having been born).
47
 As far as allowing for variety in 
acts of will between two subjects, an example is given below. 
Here is an example. Subject a) and subject b) are in two adjacent rooms, unable to see 
one another. Both think they are in a waiting room, waiting to see a lab director or some medical 
sort about an experiment they have both volunteered to participate in. What they do not know is 
that their character is actually being tested while they wait. In both rooms, a wallet lies under a 
stool on the floor. It appears to be abandoned, and several hundred dollars are visible coming out 
                                                 
46 Prize Essay. 85. 
47Ibid., p. 85. On moral approbation, see Prize Essay, pgs 83-84. 
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of its middle. Subject a) picks up the wallet and pockets the money, but doesn’t want the actual 
leather wallet, so he is careful not to leave any prints on it and slyly puts it back under the stool. 
Subject b) on the other hand, takes the wallet and goes to the receptionist desk and rings the bell, 
so that he can report the wallet as lost. The difference is one of character: the qualities of subject 
a)’s character are supposed to be comprised so as that his will is pleased by taking the money. 
Conversely, subject b) reasons and imagines that returning the wallet to its former owner is 
innately good, and that performing this act is the right thing to do, in other words, his duty, and 
that doing the opposite would be wrong, perhaps even sinful.
48
 This in turn is a reflection of his 
character, or predisposition of his will to avoid “stealing” because it makes him feel bad, 
ashamed, guilty, etc. In this case, fear actually becomes the operative motive, as I see it, and this 
is a fear of feeling bad (an emotional affection of the will).
49
 
Yet we must not shirk from this obvious mistake: the place and ground of character are 
not mentioned in the Prize Essay. If it is supposed to be inborn, indeed, is to have functions 
within some undisclosed faculty of cognition, it must have a ground. Furthermore, we should be 
informed as to how much of an influence it has on our individuated will, and how such a will, 
which affects nothing, is itself affected by both a) character and b) acts of will. One is reminded 
of Schopenhauer’s unending insistence on the soundness and necessity of his law of causality, 
                                                 
48 This example is my own original creation, but puts the transcendental explanation of character into the moralistic 
context in which Schopenhauer explains it. See Prize Essay, pgs 50-55. The attempted explanation of how character 
works is my own, since one can not be found in the Prize Essay. Also, see Kierkegard, Soren. Is there a Teleological 
Suspension of the Ethical? Nineteenth Century Philosphy, Baird, Forrest E., and Kaufman, Walter. Prentice Hall, 
2001. The latter provides famous questions about ethical values, in particular, on whether they are established via 
reason or absurdity. 
49 It is my contention that all willing is in a sense fear-driven, or at least operant, and not blind as Schopenhauer 
maintained. However, the explanation of how fear operates in the supposedly “moral” considerations of subject b) is 
more fitting than that of subject a). 
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yet where is it to be found with regard to character, or, as we will see in a bit, with regard to the 
will eternal itself? We will keep these questions in mind as indicating problem areas in the 
coherence of Schopenhauer’s early system.   
V Conclusion and higher view 
We now move on to examine Schopenhauer’s concluding remarks on the freedom of the 
will. Schopenhauer eventually characterizes the existence of man as having both empirical 
necessity and transcendental freedom. By empirical necessity, he means every deterministic 
proposition in the existence of the subject hitherto expounded. By transcendental freedom, he 
means the will as a Ding an sich, the noumenal “source” of the intelligible manifestations within 
the faculty of cognition. These manifestations are expressible within the principle of sufficient 
reason, and recognizable through any of the four classes or faculties of the subject (one such 
faculty, reason, postulates matter, and hence the physical body, which is also a manifestation). 
The will, transcendental to all manifestation, is beyond considerations of space, time, and 
causality. As such, it is entirely free.
50
 Furthermore, it is “abstracted” “…from the appearance 
and all its forms in order to arrive at that which, outside all time, is to be thought of as the inner 
essence of the human being in himself.”
51
 He says also that, “Consequently, the will is indeed 
free, but only in itself and outside the appearance.” He therefore concludes that the essi (essence, 
noumena) is free, and the operari (action) is determined. Hence, freedom of the will is in itself, 
and nowhere to be found anywhere in the faculty of cognition, tightly run by the principle of 
sufficient reason, nor in the actions of man. 
As a final conclusion to what has been said, it must be added that Schopenhauer gives 
little to no argument as to how we can prove, “abstract,” or demonstrate this noumenal will. He 
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runs into the problem of proposing something that is necessarily precluded from all human 
knowledge. Moreover, he even proposes to assign it functions and dispositions and qualities and 
other such vanities, when its entire existence must be called into doubt. While Schopenhauer’s 
analogies of will to forces of nature are slightly appeasing, there is not much detail we can 
ascertain from such analogies. Such analogies are in fact nothing more than that famous cave 
allegory of Plato, where the Ideal is “apprehended,” yet beyond its corresponding, transient, 
uncertain physical counterparts. Schopenhauer wants instead a transcendental argument- but for 
this one needs reasons, and reasons are knowable reasons. Yet he tries to construct a 
transcendental argument for a transcendentally free will, when there is absolutely no 
demonstrable ground or reason for its existence. In this early system, one can not distinguish 
between an argument for the transcendent freedom of the will via analogy, and a transcendental 
argument, since the transcendental is reduced to the transcendent, when such an argument 
proposes something unknowable as a “necessary” ground. 
In conclusion, a good and thorough explication of Schopenhauer’s early theory of will 
has been expounded. Critical comments have been included all along the paper, and a final 
critique of his failed attempt at a transcendental argument for the freedom of the will has even 
been included. The continuation of this study will result in explicating Schopenhauer’s mature 
theory of will, with the intention to find more argumentative support for his key notion of a 
transcendental will. As this early theory of will has proven to be mostly epistemological in 
nature, it is expected that the later theory of will might be much more metaphysical, and this is 
looked forward to. Additional comments will be added in the mature theory of will, as seen fit.            
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Arthur Schopenhauer: Platonic Tenets of his System and the Failure of their Implementation 
 
In this essay, I will show how Schopenhauer’s attempt to use Platonic forms in his 
matured theory of will creates serious problems for his system. We will see how, although 
producing notable iconoclasm and originality in western philosophy, Schopenhauer’s thinking 
nonetheless becomes entangled with some of the traditional problems in metaphysics and life 
ethics, eventually appealing to traditional elements in Platonism as attempted solutions to his 
system’s problems. Salient among the internal problems of Schopenhauer’s own system, and 
consistent within his own philosophical terms, is the failure of his attempt to use Platonic Ideas 
as a quasi-medium in order to bridge the noumenal and phenomenal worlds. The failure of this 
attempt then jeopardizes the establishment of his ethic of the renunciation of the will to live, and 
consequently imposes some serious questions on the method he uses for his system’s 
establishment.  
In the end we will see that, amidst all Schopenhauer’s circumlocutive scholiums, 
linguistic erudition, and learned discourse, there exists a strong, traditional Platonic nature and 
method to his system building, the use of which does not strengthen the viability of his system, 
but weakens it. 
Rather than defining my terms out of their proper context, it is better that we go directly 
to Schopenhauer’s main work, The World as Will and Representation, so that I can elucidate his 
claims, method, and the consequent problems of his matured philosophical system. The object of 
this essay is argumentative more so than explicative, and so all explication will be useful only in 
so far as it is expository toward the main argument and objectives stated above. 
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We begin with some preliminary remarks about Schopenhauer’s system. First, 
Schopenhauer divides the world into two basic realities: phenomenal and noumenal.
52
 The 
phenomenal world is what is known to us scientifically and through the principle of sufficient 
reason. The necessity by which everything is governed by this principle is the work of his early 
theory of will, and in this work the mind is divided into four cooperating faculties of cognition, 
i.e., causality (comprised of the a priori forms for the possibility for all experience, and unified 
and experienced in the representation  of mater), reason, being, and motivation. As is stands, I 
have moved earlier to unify reason and being, the second of the four faculties as adduced in 
Schopenhauer’s Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and objected to his 
statements on geometry and arithmetic; yet these objections are in this essay moot. The 
noumenal world, on the other hand, is the Ding an sich, or thing in itself, in other words, the 
necessary condition for the possibility of mind, perception, causality, or anything within the 
consciousness of the subject. There is only one ultimate ground, as Schopenhauer claims, and 
this is the transcendental will.
53
 It is defined as the ground of every representation and force of 
nature, its own nature being a “blind striving” and endlessly deficient, aimless existence, this 
striving being the will to live.
54
 For Schopenhauer, the transcendental will is the thing in itself.  
Now one condition Schopenhauer establishes is that the mind can not posit itself as object 
of will, that is, according to the principle of sufficient reason. He does of course think it is 
possible to posit the mind as the manifestation of will, but whether we could still call this an 
“object” is under question, although he does call our bodies objects of will, and so we can 
suppose he would extend the same nomenclature to the mind. Furthermore, I find it questionable 
in which sense one posits the mind as objectification of will, that is, “how can this be done with 
                                                 
52 This draws from Kant’s prior distinction between the two worlds. 
53 Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will, pg 86, 87. 
54 Schopenhauer calls the will-to-live the innermost nature of the world itself. II, 350 
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knowledge, when knowledge has no bearing on the noumenal world?” In other words, we cannot 
posit the mind as object of a noumenon according to the principle of sufficient reason, because 
the principle of sufficient reason is valid only for the phenomenal world, or the world of 
representation. The most likely answer of Schopenhauer would be that through feeling and our 
experience of our bodies as immediate object (the primary objectification of will in which we 
experience sensuous reality, and the first objectification of the will through which knowledge is 
made possible, via the brain), we are granted an extra insight into the noumenal thing-in-itself. 
Ultimately, this insight depends on a “realization” of the Platonic Idea(s), which is the alleged 
method of art, and the meaning of which is the object of philosophy. We shall speak of these 
Ideas later. 
There is also an ambiguity as to whether a ground is a knowable object. What little 
Schopenhauer says of this seems to indicate that he regards grounds, as everything in the 
phenomenal world, as objects. While this may be a dissention from later phenomenology, 
Schopenhauer thinks in general that the world perceived via representation is nothing but a 
conglomerate of related representations, able to be surveyed by man by the use of his reason. He 
says, “…but what else could a ground be, but an object…?” To extend this position in his favor, 
a ground for say, a judgment would be the perceived experience of causality, and this perceived 
instance of causality is itself very conceivable under a general concept. 
The concept, which Schopenhauer develops more thoroughly in his main work than 
previously, is abstracted from the perception of an instance of causality into a general rule or 
concept. In other words, general concepts are built in an inductive manner, but not merely from 
observations of experiences, but through the principle of sufficient reason, and this principle 
regulates how the a priori perception of raw experience is formed into a general concept. The 
29 
content of concepts does not include all of the content of experience, but rather is formed in a 
way in which reason can call any particularly a priori perceived instance of experience from any 
concept that was formed from it. The perception of an everyday object, for example, is grounded 
in how the principle of sufficient reason imposes itself on the mind of the subject. 
Everything so far has served as a brief outline of some of the key tenets in 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy, along with a couple of questions. However, we cannot progress to a 
discussion of the Ideas by recapitulating; we must go straight to a discussion of the Platonic 
Ideas, bearing what has already been said in mind.  
The paramount item to understanding the problems of Schopenhauer’s use of the Ideas is 
a thorough description of the Ideas as Schopenhauer sees them. Simply put, they are the essences 
of every particular phenomenal manifestation of the will.
55
 The Platonic Idea is something which 
is an immediate reflection of the thing-in-itself, i.e., will, and Schopenhauer calls it the 
“…therefore adequate, objectivity of the thing-in-itself…” Somewhat paradoxically, he goes on 
in that very sentence to say, “…the will in so far as it is not yet objectified, has not yet become 
representation.” We gather from this description that the Idea, its total nature yet to be revealed, 
lies somewhere between the transcendental will and the world of phenomena.     
In fact, Schopenhauer says that the Idea is a “being-object-for-a-subject,” and I will 
explain, with his own quotations, what he means by this.
56
 He thinks that the Idea is the primary, 
                                                 
55 Schopenhauer also thinks phenomena are manifestations of forces of nature, i.e., of the will. This is an interesting 
insight, particularly with its implications on the incompleteness of modern scientific understanding, particularly its 
heuristic limitation short of the qualitas occulta (hidden quality).Yet the insight remains nonessential to his system 
as a whole. See I, pgs. 80-81, 97. 
56 The World as Will and Representation, Vol. I, pg. 175. I will refer to this simply as I, and to the second volume as 
II. Both volumes are listed in the bibliography. 
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most universal objectivity of the will.
57
 This instantiates another division of terms and notions in 
Schopenhauer’s whole system. Just like two sides of a coin, Schopenhauer divides reality into 
the noumenal world and the “ideal” or “medial” world, the world of Platonic Ideas.
58
 The entire 
will as thing-in-itself has a completely mirror reflection of itself: the medial world, where the 
whole objectivity of the will as Platonic Idea lies. In turn, reality is further divided into the 
phenomenal world, in which objectification takes place. Additionally, the most universal 
reflection of the will is its yet unobjectified objectivity, the Idea; this is essentially the medial 
world between the noumenal and phenomenal worlds (refer to figure I). 
As for the nomenclature “being-object-for-a-subject,” subject, as we know, refers to the 
transcendentally possible process of an object being perceived. In other words, the subject is 
what perceives any object, and we know in phenomenology that this is how object perception is 
ostensibly possible. However, there is yet another division between individuated and non-
individuated subject, because Schopenhauer insists that objects are perceived by individuated 
subjects, while the Idea is apprehended only by “non-individuated” subject.
59
 Again, as we 
know, every manifestation of the will is necessarily posited by the mind as object, and this is 
done by subject (mind). The mind itself is contingent upon the ultimate ground of will.
60
 But 
insofar as the thing in itself is objectified into the phenomenal world, and therefore subject to the 
principle of sufficient reason, i.e., knowledge, it can only be perceived by an individuated 
                                                 
57 The reason that the Idea is not a “manifestation” or “objectification” of the will per se is because every 
objectification is represented to the individuated subject through knowledge, hence, through the governing laws of 
the principle of sufficient reason. Every objectification is therefore individuated, i.e. particular, in that it is 
represented to an individual subject at a specific time (and therefore subject to causality), and in that it is a reflection 
of a more universal Idea. Therefore, we should take care to distinguish the term “objectification” from “objectivity.”    
58 I invented the terms “medial” and “Ideal world.” Schopenhauer does not use them, but instead speaks only of the 
Ideas. I call it medial because it lies between the will and phenomenal worlds. 
59 This is supposedly the pure form of “subject,” as the most general subject possible as the Idea is the pure from of 
“object.” Unfortunately, neither is knowable (or at least knowable in any useful sense, as I will explain later), being 
beyond the grasp of the principle of sufficient reason. 
60 We have a difficulty in calling the will a “ground,” since Schopenhauer says it is not a cause of phenomena, but 
that phenomena are a representation of it. See I, p. 140. 
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subject. Insofar as the thing in itself is mirrored in the medial world as its objectivity, it can only 
be apprehended by the non-individuated subject. This division forces us to ask, “Why can’t the 
individuated subject perceive the Idea?” The answer is that the Idea is a mirror reflection of the 
will as objectivity, not objectification. The individuated subject can perceive only individuated 
objects of knowledge- subject to space, time, and causality- and since the Platonic Idea is 
universal, not individuated, the individuated subject cannot perceive it. Schopenhauer explicitly 
says that the principle of sufficient reason “has no meaning…” to the Platonic Ideas.
61
 Thus, the 
Platonic Idea(s) are beyond “valid” knowledge, assuming that such knowledge must be 
established and grounded by the principle of sufficient reason.
62
 We see then from this how the 
Idea is medial and lies between the phenomenal and noumenal worlds, and also how it is beyond 
the individuated subject. What I will describe now is the role which the Ideas play in 
Schopenhauer’s system.   
Schopenhauer begins to speak about Ideas which are more or less perfect than one 
another, and I will explain his notion of the “higher” Idea and its role.
63
 “This higher Idea 
subdues all the less perfect phenomena previously existing, yet in such a way that it allows their 
essential nature to continue in a subordinate manner, since it takes up into itself an analogue of 
them.” He means to imply here (and states explicitly elsewhere) that there are Ideas independent 
of the principle of sufficient reason which become manifest as particular objects such as plants 
and animals. What he means (and does not clearly explain) by the term “perfect” is what I aim to 
explain. As in Plato, an Idea is the essence which reflects itself in various degrees and gradations 
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as physical reifications of itself.
64
 For Schopenhauer, physical objects are reifications of the will 
to live, its direct “mirror image” is the Idea, and physical objects are reflections of Ideas. Since 
the will as thing in itself is the transcendental ground for all phenomenal manifestation, we can 
take it to be complete within itself. This simply means that we cannot consider it to have any 
deficiencies, i.e., it is simply what it is. Any particular object, on the other hand, will represent 
only a particularity of the will at a certain time, and in a certain point in space, and additionally 
to an individuated subject, grasping the manifestation with the particular means of his body at a 
certain time, etc. Phenomena can therefore be seen as incomplete reflections of the thing in itself. 
Considering that our word “perfect” comes from the Latin perfectus, meaning “complete,” it is 
no surprise that Schopenhauer, or at least Schopenhauer in translation, would consider 
phenomena that represent more of the will than others to be more complete and therefore more 
perfect than others. By more perfect, Schopenhauer merely means more completely manifesting 
the will as thing in itself, which is of course a blind striving and the will to exist.  
For example, the will strives to exist, and we see this as its general modus operandi; the 
will’s complete mirror reflection is the Platonic Idea, and this in turn is separated into many 
Ideas, which have everyday objects as their representation.
65
 Now if the will is a blind striving to 
exist, as Schopenhauer says, it should have the Idea of existence as its core reflection.
66
 This Idea 
in turn furnishes itself into two Ideas, one an Idea of the existence of, say, a plant, and another of 
a frog. Both Ideas will manifest themselves to the individuated subject through the laws of the 
principle of sufficient reason, appearing in space, time, and causality, but in order that we may 
understand the example, we have to understand the Ideas’ objectification completely. By this I 
                                                 
64 In Plato, e.g., Meno, mathematical thinking is also supposed to reflect knowledge of the Forms via recollection, 
but Schopenhauer classifies mathematical knowledge as subordinate to the principle of sufficient reason. 
65 I will have to comment on this aspect of the Ideas a little later. 
66 It does not, however, have the Idea of existence as the core tenet of its reflection. Working hypothetically, I will 
assume that it does, so that I may give the rest of the example. 
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mean that we only have to look at the characteristics and behaviors of the two objects, plant and 
frog, in order to see how one more completely objectifies our Platonic Idea of existence. The 
plant, needing only to passively receive light for photosynthesis, absorb water, and adapt at most 
some sort of camouflage or poison to prevent being eaten by predators, exemplifies many aspects 
of living which are inseparably bound up with the larger notion of existence: it uses energy, 
consumes space, water, and to a slight degree adapts to its environment, all of which are survival 
strategies which we view as being under the general heading “existence: plant: how to.” A frog, 
on the other hand, does much more than our particular plant- it developed organs as more 
sophisticated means of sustaining itself, partly through vision, touch, smell, and taste. It 
developed articulate digits so that it can position itself on most any terrain, large leg muscles so 
that it can jump away from predators in a moment’s notice, a camouflage skin to hide itself 
among plants or trees, pheromones to emit so that it can attract a mate and propagate. All this it 
is likely to do in its lifetime, and we can view each adaptation to its environment, suited to the 
prolongation of its survival, as a phenomenon exemplifying particular aspects of the Idea of the 
frog’s existence, as odd as that may sound. The Idea of the frog’s existence is more perfect than 
the Idea of the plant’s existence, because the frog exists more completely than the plant, i.e., it is 
an objectification of more of the faculties used to prolong existence, the sole urge of the will as 
thing in itself. The “lower” Ideas which the frog (the Idea of the frog’s existence objectified) 
subdues, yet allows to continue in a “subordinate manner” is the objectified Idea of the plant, 
since the frog uses the plant for its own existence as a natural camouflaging environment, the 
habitat of its insect food, etc. Thus, the plant has its own existence, while the frog incorporates 
the existence of the plant, while building a more complete existence upon it.
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67 Schopenhauer says the hierarchy of the complexity and completeness of living organisms has “definite grades of 
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It is of course obvious that there are a number of problems with the above scenario, and I 
hope to show how they constitute real logistic problems for Schopenhauer’s system as a whole. 
The first problem I want to address is not the most severe of the problems, but is rather a sort of 
symptom of the main problem already alluded to. Schopenhauer’s notion of “perfection,” or 
“completeness” assumes that any objectification of the will as will-to-live has to be subdued by a 
more perfect Idea. The human race, for example, certainly has subdued, in its own opinion 
anyway, all other races. But it has not subdued the forces of nature which still baffle and even 
occasionally scatter us. This does not destroy Schopenhauer’s claim that the human race is the 
summit of the objectivity of the will-to-live, but it does make us question how the design or 
hierarchy of “higher Ideas” is structured, and what the structural criteria are. There was a similar 
problem faced by the doctrinal theory of the “great chain of being” and its proponents in 
medieval Europe, in that there always lay a difficulty in establishing, according to somewhat 
naïve rules and criteria, a hierarchy of the perfection of all the creatures of the earth.
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The biggest problem with Schopenhauer’s system is the proposed role of the Platonic 
Ideas. There is a twofold problem: first, the Ideas are in some way to make the thing in itself 
more knowable to the subject, via the medial world, although this is impossible according to 
Schopenhauer’s own terms, and secondly, The Ideas are supposed to reflect a mirror image of 
the thing in itself, whose properties are completely unknowable, and therefore we cannot tell 
whether there should be one or many Ideas, nor what they should be exactly. 
                                                                                                                                                             
its (will’s) objectivity…” He also notes that the human race is the pinnacle of the will as will-to-live, since it 
subdues all other life forms under it. “Thus the will-to-live generally feasts on itself, and is in different forms its own 
nourishment, till finally the human race, because it subdues all the others, regards nature as manufactured for its own 
use.”  I, p. 147.  
68 Of course, the standard of perfection was different for medieval scholars, the more perfect organisms being closer 
to God. 
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 Clearly, if we concede that the will as thing in itself is a “blind impulse,” an irrational, 
lawless urge that when objectified becomes the will-to-live, we must imagine that the will as 
thing in itself is either of uniform or multifarious aspect.
69
 In other words, we have to ask 
ourselves, given Schopenhauer’s claims, as to what the character of the thing in itself is, and 
whether it has many, one, or any “properties” at all. Of course, Schopenhauer’s answer is that the 
will is somehow knowable, yet absolutely beyond the bounds of knowledge itself. Knowledge is 
individuated and particular, as I have described already, so anything transcendental or Ideal (a 
Platonic Idea) is necessarily beyond the scope of human knowledge. This is precisely because 
Ideas, the thing in itself, and the qualitas occulta are not subject to the laws of the principle of 
sufficient reason, and likewise non-individuated. How then are we to tell how many Idea(s) 
should reflect the will? What are they reflecting? How are they reflected? How can we really 
know the nature of the will if it is completely outside valid knowledge, if not by some strange 
intuition, or more likely, tautologous presupposition? These questions remain unanswered. 
Likewise, if we don’t have a method of understanding how many Ideas there are or what they 
should be, we are unable to ascertain which phenomenon belongs to which Idea, and vice versa. 
The fact is, Schopenhauer fails to give a sound way of grounding the knowledge of the Ideas, the 
thing in itself, even the qualitas occulta, because he himself considers them to be outside the 
bounds of knowledge, which is individuated. It is therefore impossible for us to know in any 
certain way, that is, according to the principle of sufficient reason, the content of the thing in 
itself or of the Platonic Ideas.
70
  
                                                 
69 He calls it a “blind impulse,” see I, p. 285. 
70 Likewise, one is forced to question what the content of the non-individuated subject is, or how we can attain 
useful information about it, since it does not operate under any laws about which we can have knowledge. Also, any 
sort of “realization” it could attain of the Ideas in the medial world would equate as knowledge to the individuated 
subject, since such a realization would be made outside the bounds of his particular knowledge. In essence, it is 
impossible for the medial and phenomenal worlds to have any transference of knowledge from one world to the 
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An individual wishing to renounce the will-to-live is faced with a serious problem. He is 
unable, as an individual, to know anything about the will as thing in itself or the Idea(s) which 
reflect it. He is unable to know an Idea; he therefore cannot make any grounded assertions about 
it (or them). What Schopenhauer does say is that an individual can “realize” the Platonic Idea by 
ascending to be, albeit temporarily, a non-individuated subject. The obvious question is, what 
good does this do the individuated subject, since he still cannot know anything about this Idea he 
has just ascended to realize? If, as Schopenhauer claims, this ascension may lead us to a sort of 
renunciation or assertion of the will-to-live, we must sincerely believe his words when he says he 
does not want …” to prescribe or recommend the one or the other…,” since there is no 
knowledgeable ground for either. We may thus suspect that Schopenhauer lays his notions of the 
renunciation of the will to live, the nature of the thing in itself, and the content of the Platonic 
Ideas according to wishes which are proscribed by his earlier admissions, namely, that 
everything knowable has to have a ground and be within the principle of sufficient reason. His 
subsequent notion of the non-individuated via “realization” of the Platonic Idea would be more 
credible if these Ideas were in turn knowable to any extent.  
                                                                                                                                                             
other. Subsequently, it is in the same way and for the same reasons impossible for the non-individuated and 
individuated subjects to have a transference of knowledge between themselves, the medial world and realizations of 
the non-individuated subject not really qualifying as modes of knowledge at all. The non-individuated subject and 
medial world therefore have no epistemological value to us who seek reasons and knowledge. 
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* As a reference above, I have provided the figure below as a brief illustration of the main tenets 
of Schopenhauer’s transcendental system of will.
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Again, the phenomenal world of objects, which Schopenhauer emphasized so much as 
being certainly grounded in scientific knowledge, are the only things knowable by the 
individuated subject. The medial and noumenal worlds are unknowable via the principle of 
sufficient reason, and therefore any assertions about their content are unreliable, even if made 
through induction, as the product of a lifetime of experience, since knowledge cannot make 
reliable claims as to the content which lies outside its own boundaries. This is exactly the case 
with the medial and noumenal worlds. 
I want to say in conclusion that I hope to have given a good summation of 
Schopenhauer’s description of the Platonic Ideas, their role, and the failure of their 
                                                 
71 Schopenhauer never makes it clear as to whether the qualitas occulta is actually a Platonic Idea. Therefore, I have 
treated it as a separate thing from the Ideas, i.e., as a force of nature. Schopenhauer very well may have maintained 
that the forces of nature are indeed Ideas. However, the little he says as to the content of the Ideas is essentially of an 
aesthetic nature, e.g., pertaining to his notion of the “beautiful.” 
Figure I 
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implementation, especially in its attempt to somehow bring the content of the will closer to 
individuated knowledge. The result of this failure is that we are forced to question the validity of 
any statements made about the content of anything outside the phenomenal world, including the 
establishment of any denial of the will-to-live. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 
Time, Spontaneity, and Will 
 
 
The first thing I would like to do in this essay is to explain and elucidate what I call the 
phenomenological standpoint, and particularly Schopenhauer’s expression of it. I will also argue 
that Schopenhauer shows how reason and logic are very useful, even in a unique philosophical 
system which is the expression of the standpoint. As we will see, Schopenhauer’s key 
phenomenological notions like the conditioning of the world by the subject, already familiar to 
the reader, will play a central role in constituting his expression of phenomenology. Another 
thing I aim to do in this essay is show how Schopenhauer’s system is philosophically viable, and 
by this I mean viable in its own right, and not merely as the work of a “transition philosopher.”    
 His main work begins with the words, “The world is my representation,” and this means 
in the strongest sense that the “world” is to every subject his own representation of it. This is in 
terms of the individuated subject, and what is perceived by him is the object; not because, as 
some may claim, the subject receives impressions of real physical objects and reasons that they 
are objective or have essential being external to him.
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 On the contrary, Schopenhauer explains 
with success that there is an instant (immediate) perception of the physical world as necessarily 
provided for by the a priori forms of pure sensibility, time, space, and causality. This means that 
the subject automatically conditions its understanding a priori of any potential object before 
even receiving sensory data. This is the phenomenological standpoint, and it is argued for 
transcendentally. 
                                                 
72 The individuated subject is the perception of objects as filtered through the principle of sufficient reason, as 
illustrated in the previous essay. The body of the individuated subject is phenomenal, appearing in time and space 
and subject to causality. Hence, Schopenhauer calls the perception of particular objects, and the particular 
phenomena associated with it (body) the individuated subject. In this paper, only the individuated subject will be 
considered for the purposes of argument. As for why I exclude the non-individuated subject from the current 
discussion, see the previous essay, pgs. 32-34.  
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 The transcendental argument, central to the establishment of the phenomenological 
standpoint, proceeds to postulate what is necessary as a ground or reason for the possibility of 
the existence of mind or perception. In other words, it asks the bold question, “On what grounds 
is the subject able to exist?” The solution to this problematic question is not a grounding in God 
or thinking substance like the modern philosophers such as Descartes thought, but rather in the 
thing-in-itself. While Kant retained God as a thing-in-itself, Schopenhauer dissents by precluding 
the possibility of God as a thing-in-itself, since there is no objective representation to indicate his 
existence. Furthermore, in the phenomenal sense of the world (as objectification of the will, or 
thing in itself), Schopenhauer clearly states that the necessary forms for the possibility of all 
perception are time, space, and causality, which we will come back to later in the paper. 
  One ramification of the establishment of Schopenhauer’s transcendental argument is the 
principle of sufficient reason. The proper method of all scientific investigation and the only sure 
means to attain certain, scientific knowledge, the principle of sufficient reason governs all of the 
thing-in-itself’s objectifications in the phenomenal world. This means that the individual subject 
conditions his entire understanding of the world according to this principle and its four 
expressions, one according to each faculty of perception or cognition. With time, space, and 
causality, the opportunity for the mind to perceive actual data is opened, and the object can be 
represented to the subject both immediately and abstractly.
73
 The key aspect here is that of the 
representation. That an object is a representation means that it cannot exist or even be 
conceivable without the subject (as Berkley also thought). However, it is conceived in relation to 
                                                 
73 “Immediate” is a word used repeatedly by Schopenhauer. On the one hand, it means “instant,” in that the 
individual subject instantly conditions perceived events in time and space according to the first expression of the 
principle of sufficient reason, via causality. The second sense of the word indicates the most primal and fundamental 
individuated objectification of the Will, the body. The body is called the immediate objectification because it is the 
first necessary objectification for the formation of individual representations, which occur in the brain of the 
individuated subject. This is not true of the non-individuated subject, which was discussed in the previous essay. 
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the subject’s a priori forms of pure sensibility (time, space, and causality), and it is the addition 
of these necessary grounds of cognition that distinguish Kant and Schopenhauer from Berkley.  
  The subject, with the knowledge that an object is representation, knows that this object 
necessarily is perceived and is therefore understood to exist only in so far as it is perceived by 
this subject. In this way one is reminded of Kierkegaard’s cry that “subjectivity is truth.” We see 
in a sense that every object is relative to the understanding of the subject. I will now move on to 
explain in more detail how objects are involved in making the phenomenological standpoint. 
First, a phenomenal “object” is merely representational, and therefore its grounding for 
existence is not really objective, but rather perceptive, as is the subject’s understanding of it. This 
is the basic standpoint of all phenomenology, and is only possible transcendentally, i.e., a priori. 
Additionally, in that an object’s content (as opposed to its form, perceived a priori) is a 
posteriori, it is accidental. The form of the object, on the other hand, is not accidental but rather 
necessary for its possibility of existence; the three forms I speak of are also known as the a priori 
forms of pure sensibility. So, the being of an object is grounded in the forms of the 
understanding of the subject.  
In this move to the standpoint of phenomenology and the transcendental, the 
philosophical mindset of what an object is has been put into terms concerned more with the 
object’s perception and less with its being, except as grounded in the a priori forms. Therefore, it 
is nearly meaningless to talk about or consider objects in a phenomenological argument as 
having independent being; since their grounds for existence (its possibility) are relative to 
perception itself.   
 On the other hand, Schopenhauer goes to great lengths to demonstrate how the forms and 
faculties of our knowledge are necessarily so, i.e., the a priori forms and subjective correlate of 
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each faculty governed by the principle of sufficient reason. In the sense that every faculty of 
phenomenal knowledge is necessarily so and the same for the possibility of each type pf object 
for every individual subject, every faculty of phenomenal knowledge is universal. The three 
forms of a priori sensibility are also necessary, standard transcendental forms for the possibility 
of cognition in every subject, and are also universal in this sense. This simply means that the 
mode and method of understanding is unilaterally identical for every subject. For example, the 
faculty (understanding, reason, being, and motive) or subjective correlate of every object of 
knowledge is necessarily so. This is how the transcendental argument shows itself in the 
phenomenal world, as the principle of sufficient reason and grounds of the four faculties of 
perception. 
 I will now explain, within the terms and standpoint already understood, the extent to 
which Schopenhauer considers the practicality of objects, their mnemonic retention, and logic, 
accomplished by the faculty of reason.  
 With the faculty of reason, Schopenhauer maintains that it is possible for the subject to 
form concepts of experience based from the representations formed from empirical intuition. 
This possibility is of course reliant on space, time, and causality. From empirical intuition 
(understanding of causality and causal events in space and time, i.e., matter) the subject uses the 
judgment as a way in which to form a general rule or principle which contains each individually 
empirically intuited representation as an instance or particular expression of this general rule. 
Concepts are then formulaic rules derived from experience, which do not retain the particulars of 
experience. However, from every concept, a particular instance of it in causality can be drawn 
out. For example, the concept of Dog is formed by the faculty of reason from representations the 
subject makes with the understanding of causality, space, and time; from this general concept or 
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rule a particular representational instance of a dog can be drawn out or cited as an 
exemplification of this concept. Any particular dog would fit as an expression of a concept, 
depending on how (according to which qualities are perceived as doglike) and from which 
experiences this concept is drawn out.
74
 
 The use of the concept is an important aspect of Schopenhauer’s system and particularly 
in this essay. This is because the concept functions primarily to enable the subject to easily 
survey all of its representations (the world as represented to oneself) and from there become 
conscious of motives. As Schopenhauer says, reason is able to reflect beyond the restriction of 
past, present, or future, or is able in other words to look into the past and future. While reason is 
always only active in the present, as we shall discuss later, it is able to imagine or set in front of 
the subject that which is desired or aimed toward. This thing, considered as object, is called 
motive, and has already been discussed in the first essay. Again, Concepts function as general 
rules and guides for organizing and manipulating all of the experience perceived by the subject 
hitherto; this organization and manipulation is necessary for any of the subject’s considerations 
of the future or past, and is called reflection. As the concept functions as a general guide, it is 
never (according to Schopenhauer) precise or detailed, and therefore is easier to reflect upon. A 
good illustration of the use of the concept is illustrated by imagining a circle. This circle 
represents the bounds of the application of a term (equivocal to a concept, as Schopenhauer tells 
us). Every concept being the equivalent of its linguistic symbol, Schopenhauer says languages is 
the conceptual medium we use to communicate and concepts and reflect upon them. A general 
term then, which represents a concept, is vague and entails examples that might be included in 
                                                 
74 There are four universal and necessary ways in which concepts are formed, the one being explained being the 
most fundamental and the basis for all the others. Schopenhauer seems to concede that individual subjects can form 
different concepts based on the same experience (in one of the four basic ways), thus allowing for the merely 
nominative nature of the concept.  
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another concept. The two circles of the term’s application then overlap, due to the fact that the 
boundaries of each term and concept were never strictly defined. For example, concepts like “hot 
and “cold” would be good examples of terms which represent abstracted concepts. The two 
terms actually overlap in how they are seen in the world; hence, their applications for the subject 
overlap. If a stone is warm, for example, it is then abstracted as the area of overlap between two 
concepts of “hot” and “cold” being applied to the object. Degrees of temperature being infinitely 
divisible, like matter and time, each concept which signifies an instance of temperature 
necessarily has an overlapping application with another of a slighter or greater degree.
75
 In the 
same way, the application of most concepts overlaps with some others.   
 The nature of each concept is nominal. As I have already mentioned, there is no 
phenomenal object independent of the perception of the subject. Therefore, to the extent that a 
representation is considered to have an existence to the subject, the concept is formed and 
retained by the subject as characteristic of this existence, this concept itself usually being based 
on many representations formed from experience. As I have also shown, the concept is 
considered only in so far as it is useful or applicable for symbolizing many empirically intuited 
instances of experience. Since the use of the concept is nothing more than practical, it should not 
be considered epistemologically as anything else other than a nominal function of the mind for 
the subject’s own convenience.
76
 Finally, the presentation of motives to and for the subject is 
accomplished through the function of concepts, their medium being symbolic terms of language, 
                                                 
75 This area raises some interesting considerations. If a term is equivocal to a concept, and a concept is a general 
rule, devoid of specific content, then how does Schopenhauer account for specific language and specialized 
terminology? I think that while Schopenhauer thinks language is the medium of concepts, he should also admit it to 
be the medium of Being (third class of representations), and furthermore unify the second and third faculties.  
76 If we consider the concept as a method of survival (i.e., serving the urge of the will), the concept and the 
mnemonic retention of it by the subject is an exemplification of the will-to-live. Therefore, the concept has a much 
different role transcendentally than it does epistemologically. 
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and this presentation takes past, present, and future perceived experience into account for its 
deliberations.
77
 
 Now practical reason, governed as the second faculty of cognition under the principle of 
sufficient reason which governs all scientific knowledge, makes use of concepts, and their 
existence is not independent of the subject; they are nominal and pragmatic. Keeping this in 
mind, let me say a few words on how Schopenhauer’s theory of reason, the practicality of 
objects, and the notion of motivation marks his thinking as truly philosophical in its own right.  
Reason is and always has been not only the tool for giving argumentative reasons or 
grounds for a philosophical or (as Schopenhauer considers it) Scientific argument, but it is also a 
practical tool for examining motives and goals. While the ultimate meaning of this function must 
be examined as a philosophical issue, that is, to the extent that reason is the tool for surveying 
motives to the subject, its necessity remains; reason, a vital faculty of the phenomenological (or 
any) mind, is necessary for the organization of the world, and this includes the organization and 
survey of motives to the subject, whether conscious or unconscious.  
 Methodology is in general a great concern for anyone who studies philosophy or 
earnestly poses philosophical questions; we could say that a philosopher’s methodology is what 
really marks him as a thinker. We have a great opportunity to shed some light on the originality 
of Schopenhauer’s theory of time and existence, key notions within his general methodology or 
standpoint which mark his thinking as having lasting innovation in the annals of western 
philosophy.  
                                                 
77 Whether or not language is really the medium of concepts or what the specific relationship between language and 
representation is remains unimportant here. The point is that Schopenhauer speaks of reason and conceptual thinking 
as being vital, practical tools for surveying past, present, and future, in order to attain specific things and goals, i.e., 
motives. 
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Regardless of the employed method, philosophical investigation is unilaterally the same 
in two respects if not among many other things: the how and the why. How is mind possible? 
How is science possible? Why act certain ways or think about certain things? Why value 
anything more than another? Why is the effect of an idea more important than its principles or 
conception? These are questions which personify, in a sense and to a limited degree, the root 
concerns of what all philosophical inquiry shares: the concern of how and why. A question of 
“what” is often raised, and the being of this “what” and its nature become the root of ontological 
discussions. Yet why and how are concerns more so exemplified in the systems following the 
phenomenological standpoint, since these systems attempt to explain our understanding of “why” 
and the possibility of (how) mind. My above claims about the concern of philosophical 
investigation, that it is always at least concerned in some way with explaining how or what, serve 
to show that a philosophy without at least these basic concerns filosofe/ o)uk 
o)no/mati e)sti/n .78 
 I hope to have shown how the phenomenological standpoint addresses the how and why 
as regards the mind and possibility of experience, as well as to have illustrated the effectiveness 
and practicality of Schopenhauer’s concept. Schopenhauer’s methodology is rooted in the 
standpoint that resists considering any phenomena as independent from the subject, but rather 
always as an object for a subject. Within this standpoint also lies a promising method of 
exploring how and why man perceives the world, while Schopenhauer additionally provides a 
fascinating account of time and existence, which I shall interpret and describe below. This will 
show how he provides a method (phenomenological system) that is viably philosophical and 
exemplifies the practicality of reason. 
                                                 
78 “Is not philosophy by name.” 
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Time and existence--- 
  For Schopenhauer, being or existence of the subject is considerable only in so far as it is 
the individuated manifestation of the will.
79
 This manifestation occurs in the physical world as 
well as in the mental world. Mental perception (reason, being, motivation) is possible only with a 
brain to use it, and so we have to consider mental perception and bodily objectification as two 
aspects of the individuated objectification of the will. In this sense, the subject has both a mind 
and a body; in terms of body, the brain is where mental thinking takes place. It is not true to say 
of Schopenhauer that mind and brain must be divorced or mutually excluded from one another. 
On the contrary, Schopenhauer maintains that the eyes and brain are tools of perceiving and 
surviving for any organism, and thus the organism gets along in the physical world. However, in 
terms of accounting for the possibility of understanding experience, the brain is said to operate 
under certain rules and using certain forms of perception. So, the human brain is that which has 
at its disposal the most advanced faculties of perception and abstracting, while other and simpler 
modes of perception are available to lower brain types, like those of animals (their perception 
lacks abstract reason). As individual manifestation of the will, the brain and its perception are 
two aspects of the individuated subject; in terms of this subject’s perception, all else is 
subordinate to it. This means that even though the subject can be said to exist as object (having 
body, extension or brain), nothing can be recognized as object, indeed, the distinction not even 
made, if not for the phenomenological condition of the subject and object. Likewise, since all 
knowledge is subject to the laws of the principle of sufficient reason, all knowledge and 
                                                 
79 Again, I mean here the actual and real existence of the individuated subject, not the Idea of it. In that the 
individual subject has a mind and body, he is alive. In that he is alive, he is said to exist. We must therefore divorce 
Schopenhauer’s consideration of real, individual existence of the individuated subject from his separate 
consideration of the Idea of subject. In other words, the Platonic Ideas are separate metaphysical entities that are 
irrelevant to the discussion or consideration of what objectified existence is for the individuated subject.  
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perception of it is particular, i.e., appearing in a particular time, place, and under certain causes. 
The perception of phenomenal knowledge thus is the mental process of the individuated subject: 
his knowledge of all objects in the world, including its knowledge of its representation of his 
brain and body to itself, necessarily operates under the familiar rules and classes of perception 
already outlined.
80
  In this way everything is subordinated to the subject, or in other words, 
everything is subordinate to his perception of it as object.  
 This having been said, life is the condition of all being. Each actual, individual existence 
and each individual subjective perception is objectified in part as living bodies or organs. 
Schopenhauer goes a step further and maintains that life and the present are inseparable. Thus, 
all real life and living things exist in the present, and not in the past or future. Our ability to recall 
the past and project into the future is accomplished by the faculty of reason, and from this and all 
the material of our perceived experience we are able to formulate and represent motives to 
ourselves. This presentation of a motive to oneself is possible only in the present, the 
individuated subject being a living, physical entity (considered in terms of his objective body).  
 Accordingly, real existence (the life of the body) is always in the present. Schopenhauer 
claims that past and future are not reified forms of existence, but rather, they are concepts. So, 
past alone is not a temporal criterion of existence, and neither is future; the body lives only in the 
present moment, while the mind projects its thoughts and motives into both past and future- yet 
these are like phantasms without objective reification. We could therefore say that past and 
future are somewhat imaginary, or at least representational, in that they do not have real 
objectification, in other words, they are concepts of moments that are void of actual objective 
                                                 
80 I have personified the perception of the individuated subject by using the pronoun “him” as an equivocation. 
Although the mind (process of perception) and body (conglomeration of physical objects associated with certain 
perceptive processes, i.e., individuated subjects, of the will) are different aspects of the subject, Schopenhauer would 
treat them both as stemming from the will as thing in itself. 
49 
material. As objectification of the will, the subject becomes the objectification of the will to live 
in the present. Hence the subject’s existence is inexorably bound to the present. 
 Schopenhauer says to compare time to “… an endlessly revolving sphere; the half that is 
always sinking would be the past, and the half that is always rising would be the future; but at the 
top, the indivisible point that touches the tangent would be the extensionless present.” 
 
Here is an illustration of Schopenhauer’s diagram. The circle spins clockwise, the tangent 
always remaining vertical. The circumference of the circle is the never-ending chain of causality 
in time, and the vertical tangent of the circle represents the position of the existence of the 
subject in time. Each dot on the circumference of the circle represents a physical event in time or 
a physical motive toward which the subject aims and strives.  
The label “subject” represents the phenomenological perception of the subject within the 
framework of time. And time, being a framework in which the subject perceives all events 
becomes an existential criterion, and that means that the subject does not merely represent 
 Figure 2 
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objects to himself through the a priori pure form of sensibility of time, but rather, comes to need 
time as a framework in which to understand his existence and role in the world.  
Furthermore, the perspective of the subject is always carried out from the standpoint of 
his body, and so he is said to be objectified by the will in the present. Now this is the perspective 
of the subject in time- indivisibly between that which has been objectified and that which will be 
objectified, whether it be motive or event in time. Yet the actual objectification occurs only in 
the present. In terms of existence, the objectification occurs as subject and his body; i.e., as life. 
  
Now spontaneity as non-determinate free will is impossible in this system, as every 
motive under the faculty of reason is what determines the individual actions of the subject. 
Spontaneity as a general non-determinism is also not scientifically possible, according to 
Schopenhauer, as every instance in the chain of causality is the effect of one object on another. It 
could be argued that the subject’s realization of the Idea as non-individuated subject is an act of 
spontaneous transcendence, but even Schopenhauer ironically puts this realization beyond the 
province of certain, scientific knowledge. And all knowledge that is certain is expressible in 
words, as certain knowledge is governed under the principle of sufficient reason and thus able to 
be abstracted into a concept, according to Schopenhauer’s own terms. Hence, what we find we 
cannot talk about and what we find to be uncertain is not adequate ground for scientific dialog. 
Philosophical dialog, on the other hand, is concerned with the how and why, and Schopenhauer, 
for his part, seems more focused on the why, and does consider discussions of realization of the 
Idea as within the province of philosophy, as it should be, even if not certain as he defines things 
to be certain. Now as for the Platonic Ideas, I have rendered them irrelevant to the current 
discussion. The question of the spontaneity of the realization of the Idea is therefore moot, as I 
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want to speak strictly about spontaneity and existence within the specific consideration of time 
proposed in the diagram. Therefore, I shall discuss the philosophical significance of the 
proposition, a specific but very significant aspect of Schopenhauer’s whole system, and 
representative of the uniqueness of the core of his whole philosophy.            
 What this original proposal attempts to show is that, while time and causality are never-
ending, every event, motive, or particular objectification is transient, and comes to pass with no 
more significance to the subject’s real existence than any other. As Schopenhauer says, “What 
was? That which is. What will be? That which was.” Even if the subject’s body is destroyed, 
since his real existence is only in the present, any moment after his destruction is of no 
importance to him. Furthermore, while motives are possible by the subject representing objects 
to himself within the form of time as past and future, the subject’s representation of motives and 
his being are objectifications of the will to live which always stay in the present. 
 We ask: how can any moment in time be indivisible? While Schopenhauer has not 
devised an answer to this question, I propose one. The answer is that time as a criterion for the 
existence of the subject is not really temporal, but mental. The subject’s perspective in the world 
is relative to what the subject perceives as past and future; his mental representation of it. The 
subject’s existence as body is representational, and Schopenhauer says that causal understanding 
is immediate, and this means that it is relative to the subject’s perspective, happening not in the 
past or future, but immediately in what we can only describe as the present. This does not mean 
that time is an accidental form where past, present, and future bend to the whims of the subject; 
rather, it is still a necessary form of sensibility and causality, but in terms of it as criterion of 
existence of the subject, it is a form which is both necessary and relative to the way in which the 
mind works. Hence, as the subject represents causality to himself immediately, as far as he 
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understands time in terms of his own present existence, relative to the past and future, he 
understands it only in terms of his existing in the immutable present. In other words, time, as 
conceived as applying to existence and the individual subject representing things to himself 
immediately, is no longer infinitely divisible, as the subject’s own perception cannot divide his 
present existence.   
 Schopenhauer’s proposal makes man’s existence and his interaction with the world out as 
something ethereal and transient. Merely a representation in the present, this moment being 
nothing but the indivisible point of view of the subject relative between past and future, the 
subject is not presumed to have mush of a real, meaningful, or significant role in the world. On 
the other hand, everything, every object is always and forever relative and dependant upon him 
and him alone; so in this sense he is the most significant existence ion the world. Yet this is and 
remains his world; the world of the subject. This presentation of reality reminds us of a dream 
where objects seem real and assured, but their actual nature is something we imagine out of our 
mind. That there are certain rules under which the mind operates is a reasonable enough 
proposal, as is Schopenhauer’s idea of the principle of sufficient reason. But that objects and 
motives, while considered in the existential context of time are necessary, and at the same time 
essentially insignificant, transient, and always coming into and passing from existence is a 
proposal that has a sort of dreamy sleepiness about it.
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 This philosophical outlook affords us an excellent insight into the phenomenological 
standpoint; while not always understood, this standpoint stands firm in one respect, but dreamy 
in another- and I do not mean this in disparaging terms, since the phenomenological standpoint 
                                                 
81  By “existential context of time,” I mean time as consisting of past, present and future, as presented in the 
diagram. Time thus becomes an existential criterion in that it establishes a medium within which the present subject 
can exist relative to past and future. This existential context of time is to be distinguished from the phenomenal 
context of time, which uses time as the a priori form and criterion for the possibility of all experience.  
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seems so necessarily reasoned for. Yet the unmistakably original quality of this system’s 
expression of the standpoint almost leaves us with a proposal that has at its core a profound near 
mysticism.  
 Nonetheless, these specific aspects of his system, which we have discussed at length, 
have afforded us a fresh, original, and defying perspective on western thinking and existence. 
That the final nature of the system, and its implied significance turns out to be a bit strange I do 
not hold as a reason to discount the thinking itself. What I hope to have accomplished, both 
thoroughly and clearly, is that first, the phenomenological standpoint itself should have been 
expounded to a limited extent here and more extensively earlier, in my essay on Schopenhauer’s 
early will. By means of Schopenhauer’s unique, systematic expression of the standpoint, I hope 
to have shown and convinced the reader that his philosophy is viable in its own right. Second, I 
want to have explained that Schopenhauer shows how reason and logic can be used in useful and 
needed ways in everyday life, even if the nature of this activity is disputable to some. Third, it 
should be clear how Schopenhauer’s consideration and proposal of time can be considered in an 
existential context, and how this context provides us an insight into the double significance of its 
expression of the phenomenological standpoint. In closing, I would like to say that 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy is much more than transitional, much more than “Kantian,” as some 
may say, and that in addition, Schopenhauer takes momentous steps both from his contemporary 
influences and into his own unique, sophisticated manner of thinking about the world. 
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